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Injuries and death are the inevitable by-products of an indus-
trialized, mechanized society. Workmen's compensation was devised
as a partial answer to the question of who shall bear the burden of
such loss of life and limb. Society has come to realize that these bur-
dens are the legitimate risks of the enterprise;' this recognition has
culminated in legislation creating a system of workmen's compen-
sation. The goal of such legislation is to provide an injured or dis-
abled employee and his dependents some means of subsistence while
he is unable to work.2  In the light of these objectives, the legis-
lature and the judiciary alike have declared that workmen's compen-
sation laws are not to be construed narrowly, but liberally, with the aim
of protecting as far as possible persons injured in the course of em-
ployment.3
Until recently, California has been a leader in the nationwide
movement towards a broader interpretation of workmen's compensa-
tion laws.4 This modem trend favors the enlargement of the scope of
workmen's compensation to "cover virtually every injury occurring by
reason of a condition or incident of the employment." 5 The decision
in Mathews v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board,6 however,
indicates that California has stepped out of this progressive trend. In
that case, the California Supreme Court, by holding section 3600(g)
of the Labor Code7 constitutional, has refused to allow recovery
1. 41 CONG. REC. 22, 26 (1906) (Annual message of President Theodore
Roosevelt).
2. Moore Shipbuilding Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n., 185 Cal.
200, 196 P. 257 (1921).
3. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3202 (West 1971). Bianco v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n., 24 Cal. 2d 584, 150 P.2d 806 (1944); La Franchi v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n., 213 Cal. 675, 3 P.2d 305 (1931); Subsequent Injuries Fund v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n., 151 Cal. App. 2d 606, 312 P.2d 78 (1957); State v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n., 126 Cal. App. 2d 740, 273 P.2d 342 (1954).
4. 2 W. HANNA, CALIFORNA LAW OF EWMLOYEE INJURMS AND WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 8.03 [1] (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as HANNA].
5. Id. § 8.02 [3].
6. 6 Cal. 3d 719, 493 P.2d 1165, 100 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1972).
7. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3600 (West 1971) reads in part as follows: "Liability
for the compensation provided by this division, in lieu of any other liability whatsoever
to any person except as provided in Section 3706, shall, without regard to negligence,
[567]
where the injury arises out of an altercation in which the injured em-
ployee is the initial physical aggressor." This decision is contrary
to the majority of jurisdictions, where the courts have allowed compen-
sation for injuries sustained by an employee in a work-connected as-
sault in which he was the initial aggressor.9
This note will explore the historical bases for the so-called "ag-
gressor defense," the modern rejection of that defense, and the pos-
sible ramifications of this California decision.
The Early Years of Workmen's Compensation10
The origins of employers' liability acts and workmen's compensa-
tion legislation are to be found in the very narrow tort liability of the
master to his servant at common law."' Even if the servant could es-
tablish his master's fault or negligence, the common law defenses of
contributory negligence,1" assumption of risk,' 3 and the fellow ser-
vant rule' 4 nearly always defeated his recovery. Thus, the majority
of industrial injuries remained uncompensated, and the losses fell
upon the workman, who was least able to bear them.' 5 The harsh-
ness of this common law approach eventually was ameliorated by
the enactment, both in England and America, of employers' liability
and workmen's compensation acts, designed to enforce the liability of
an employer for certain industrial injuries. 16
exist against an employer for any injury sustained by his employees arising out of and
in the course of the employment and for the death of any employee if the injury
proximately causes death, in those cases where the following conditions of compen-
sation concur: . . . . (g) where the injury does not arise out of an altercation in
which the injured employee is the initial physical aggressor."
8. 6 Cal. 3d at 740, 493 P.2d at 1179, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
9. 1 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 11.15(a) (1972) [hereinafter
cited as LARSON].
10. For a more complete summary of the historical development of workmen's
compensation, see generally S. RIESENFELD & R. MAXWELL, MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLA-
TION (1950).
11. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 80 at 525 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. See generally 2 HANNA § 1.02[2].
12. E.g., Limberg v. Glenwood Lumber Co., 127 Cal. 598, 60 P. 176 (1900).
13. E.g., O'Malley v. South Boston Gas Light Co., 158 Mass. 135, 32 N.E. 1119
(1893).
14. In Priestley v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837) Lord Abinger formu-
lated the now famous fellow servant rule, precluding a servant's recovery from the
master for an injury received in the course of employment, where such injury was
solely caused by the negligence of another servant of the same master. This doctrine
was upheld in Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842).
The court held the railroad immune from liability to an engineer where the injury was
caused by the negligent act of a switchman.
15. 1 W. SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 1 (3d ed. 1941). Schneider
estimated that 70% of industrial accidents remain uncompensated.
16. 2 HANNA § 1.03[1][a].
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The development of the concept of workmen's compensation
may be traced to Germany, where for the first time compensation for
injuries was conditioned, not on the basis of negligence, but on the
relationship of the injury to the employment."' England expanded
upon the German idea and, after several false starts, in 1897 adopted
the British Workmen's Compensation Act.18 Liability, as in the Ger-
man legislation, depended not on who was at fault for the accident,
but on whether it arose out of employment while the worker was en-
gaged therein. English jurists devised the phrase "personal injury by
accident arising out of and in the course of employment" as the ba-
sis for recovery by the workman.' 9
The German and English legislation had important repercus-
sions in the United States. 0 Most state acts were patterned after
the British legislation, and nearly all followed the formulae adopted by
the British act defining the boundaries of the employer's liability.2 '
Thus, the common law bases of liability-fault and negligence-were
replaced by a new concept. This concept was liability without fault,
dependent only on the relation of the injury to the employment. The
motivation for such legislation was humanitarian in nature: to make
the industry which was responsible for the injury bear a major part
of the burdens resulting therefrom.2 2  "The cost of the product
should bear the blood of the workman. 2 3
The Development of Workmen's Compensation in California
Prior to 1907, the liability of a California employer for injuries
to his employees was based on the common law tort standard of due
care. Various legislation was adopted from 1907 to 1917 abrogat-
ing the common law defenses and establishing a compulsory com-
pensation system.24 The Workmen's Compensation, Insurance and
17. Horovitz, The Litigious Phrase "Arising Out of Employment", 3 NACCA
L.J 15, 21 (1949). See generally Brooks, Compulsory Insurance in Germany in
U.S. CoMMSSiONER OF LAoR, FOURTH SPECIAL REPORT 84 (1893).
18. Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897, 60 & 61 Vict., c. 37, amended by
Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 58. For a history of British
compensation legislation, see D. HANEs, THE F= BRiTlSH CoNENSATION Acr 1897
(1968).
19. Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 58, § 1(1).
20. For a history of American workmen's compensation legislation, see W.
DODM, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1936).
21. R. STEFFEN, AGENcY-PAnTNERsmP 127 (3d ed. 1969).
22. Ahmed's Case, 278 Mass. 180, 179 N.E. 684 (1932).
23. This remark is generally attributed to Lloyd George. See PRossER, supra
note 11, at 530 n.37.
24. Cal. Stat. 1907, ch. 97, § 1, at 119 (limitation of the defense of assumption
of risk); Cal. Stat. 1911, ch. 399, § 3, at 796 (abrogation of the defenses of con-
tributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule); Cal. Stat. 1913,
February 19731
Safety Act of 1917, as amended over the years, represents the pres-
ent law.2 5 With the adoption of this act in 1917, the legislature pro-
posed extensive amendments to Article XX, section 2126 of the Cali-
fornia Constitution to insure the constitutional validity of the new com-
prehensive system of compulsory compensation. 7  This amendment
was adopted in 1918.28 It expressly vests the legislature with the
power, unfettered by any other constitutional provisions, to impose li-
ability on employers to compensate their workmen for disability or in-
jury, and their dependents for death, irrespective of the fault of any
party.29 The legislation enacted pursuant to this constitutional man-
date has been codified in the Labor Code.3"
The Scope of Liability
As stated earlier, the test for employers' liability adopted by most
workmen's compensation acts is whether the injury has arisen out of
and in the course of the employment. The California workmen's
compensation act is no exception. 3 However, as Larson32 points out,
the theory behind workmen's compensation is fundamentally distinct
from strict tort liability:
The right to workmen's compensation depends on one simple test:
Was there a work-connected injury? Negligence and . . . fault
are not in issue and cannot affect the result. Let the employer's
conduct be flawless in its perfection, and let the employee's be abys-
mal in its clumsiness, rashness, and ineptitude: if the accident
arises out of and in the course of the employment, the employee re-
ceives his award. Reverse the positions, with a careless and stupid
employer and a wholly innocent employee: the same award issues.
Thus, the test is not the relation of an individual's personal quality
ch. 176, § 1, at 279 (creation of a workmen's compensation system); Cal. Stat. 1917,
ch. 586, § 1, at 832 (creation of a compulsory and comprehensive system of work-
men's compensation).
25. Cal. Stat. 1917, ch. 586, at 831. -See also 2 B. WIThIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAw 1651 (7th ed. 1960).
26. The California Constitution had been amended in 1911 by article XX, § 21
to permit the legislature to create a system of workmen's compensation free of common
law defenses.
27. Senate Const. Amend. 30, Cal. Stat. 1917, ch. 60, at 1953.
28. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 21 which provides in part: "The Legislature is
hereby expressly vested with plenary power, unlimited by any provision of this Con-
stitution, to create, and enforce a complete system of workmen's compensation, by
appropriate legislation, and in that behalf to create and enforce a liability on the part
of any or all persons to compensate any or all of their workmen for injury or dis-
ability, and their dependents for death incurred or sustained by the said workmen in
the course of their employment, irrespective of the fault of any party."
29. Id.
30. CAL. LABOR CoDE §§ 3201-6002 (West 1971 & West Supp. 1972).
31. See note 7 supra.
32. 1 LARsON, supra note 9, at § 2.00.
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(fault) to an event, but the relationship of an event to an em-
ployment. The essence of applying the test is not a matter of as-
sessing blame, but of marking out boundaries.
33
It has largely been left to the courts to delineate these boundaries, and
it is in this area of statutory construction that problems arise most fre-
quently.
The "Arising Out Of" Test Applied to Assaults
The early English compensation cases generally applied narrow
agency-tort concepts to work injuries stemming from assaults. The
typical result was a denial of compensation on the grounds that the as-
sault did not arise out of and in the course of employment."4 The
early American cases followed much the same line of reasoning.
3 5
Small, discussing these cases in The Effect of Workmen's Compen-
sation on Agency-Tort Concepts of Scope of Employment, concluded
that the courts were guided by a very narrow definition of the term
"employment. 30
The courts continued to deny compensation even to the victims
of work assaults until 1920, when a minor revolution occurred.
3 7
Justice Cardozo, then on the New York court, attacked the rule of non-
liability and allowed a claimant, a nonparticipating victim of a sportive
assault, to recover: "The claimant was injured, not merely while he
was in a factory, but because he was in a factory, in touch with as-
sociations and conditions inseparable from factory life."3 8  Horovitz
declares that Justice Cardozo deserves the "chief credit for at least
saving innocent victims from the charity scrap-heap," 39 but adds that
while the majority of jurisdictions followed this rule for the innocent
victims, 40 they began to issue dicta against the aggressor, i.e., the ini-
tiator of the assault.41 Successive cases were replete with the proposi-
33. Id. § 2.10.
34. E.g., Armitage v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry., [1902] 2 K.B. 178.
35. Jacquemin v. Turner & Seymour Mfg. Co., 92 Conn. 382, 103 A. 115
(1918) (Dispute arose over possession of a tool which both employees wanted to use);
Gavros' Case, 240 Mass. 399, 134 N.E. 269 (1922) (Group of employees were fighting
over the right to use tools. Gavros, a non-participant, asked them to stop, whereupon
two of the men smashed his head with a shovel and sledge hammer. The court
found that Gavros' intervention had nothing to do with his employment).
36. 11 NACCALJ. 19,22(1953).
37. Horovitz, Assaults and Horseplay Under Workmen's Compensation Laws,
41 ILL. L. REv. 311, 319 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Assaults and Horseplay].
38. Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N.Y. 470, 472, 128 N.E. 711 (1920).
39. Assaults and Horseplay, supra note 37, at 319.
40. E.g., Hegler v. Cannon Mills, 224 N.C. 669, 671, 31 S.E.2d 918, 919 (1944).
The court stated that "while the assault may have resulted from anger or revenge, still
it was rooted in and grew out of the employment." Accord, Sykes v. Craycroft
Brick Co., 12 Cal. Comp. Cases 237 (1947).
41. Assaults and Horseplay, supra note 37, at 323. Horovitz declares that
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tion that he who starts a fight as an initial aggressor cannot recover for
his own injuries.42 Thus, the aggressor defense was born.
The courts utilizing this aggressor defense generally based their
decisions on one or more of the following theories.43 The earlier
cases set forth the notion that it is "contrary to all justice and law" to
compensate an aggressor or his dependents;" that is, a man should not
profit from his own wrongdoing. However, this rationale was con-
trary to the basic principle of workmen's compensation which is to
place the costs of industrial accidents on industry, without regard to
the culpability of the employer or the employee.45 "That there is a
natural repugnancy to help a guilty party is no excuse for relieving in-
dustry of a liability and placing it on the worker or charity."'46
Another reason given for the validity of the aggressor defense
was that a fight by necessity arose out of the act of aggression, not
out of the employment.1 Somewhat akin to this argument was the
proposition that the employee, by initiating the hostilities, had "stepped
out of" the course of employment and, at least as to his own injuries,
was not within the purview of the compensation act.48 The basic
error in these arguments was the failure to recognize the causal con-
nection between the frictions, conditions and contacts of employment
and the initial act of aggression.4 9
The real problem in the aggressor doctrine, however, was not in
the various theories put forth as a rationalization of the defense, but in
the application of the doctrine itself. The courts had to determine
who was the aggressor. Any attempt to determine who in fact initi-
ated the altercation was by its nature an exercise in futility. The
"[t]he reason for the dicta against the aggressor was clear. In trying to make a new
rule or exception palatable, it has for years been customary for courts to throw a judi-
cial bone of solace to the losing employer or insurer. . . . It has been the history of
law that when courts wish to make a change, they proceed cautiously, that they put
boundaries around the change, and thereby issue dicta which gives the loser some hope
in future cases, thus making the decision presumably acceptable to both parties ...
Hence arose the exception to the new rule-that the aggressor could not recover." Id.
42. E.g., Horvath v. La Fond, 305 Mich. 69, 8 N.W.2d 915 (1943); Staten v.
Long-Turner Const. Co., 185 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Mo. App. 1945). In Staten, the
court determined that "clearly, an aggressor is not in the course of his employment and
is not entitled to compensation for an injury caused by his own uncontrolled emotions,
threats and demonstrations of assault upon another."
43. 1 LARSON, supra note 9, at § 11.15(a).
44. Horvath v. La Fond, 305 Mich. 69, 8 N.W.2d 915 (1943).
45. See Horovitz, Workmen's Compensation Law, Review of Leading Current
Cases, 15 NACCA L.J. 29, 33-34 (1955).
46. Assaults and Horseplay, supra note 37, at 346-47.
47. Fischer v. Industrial Comm'n., 408 Ill. 115, 96 N.W.2d 478 (1951).
48. Staten v. Long-Turner Const. Co., 185 S.W.2d 375 (Mo. App. 1945). See
also text accompanying note 73 infra.
49. 1 LARSON, supra note 9, at § 11.15(a).
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first blow was often the automatic and irrational flashpoint of a host
of mounting antecedent pressures. Furthermore, the first blow may
have been as harmless as a mere tap on the shoulder while the second
blow resulted in death. The aggressor doctrine required that the courts
find an act of "initial aggression" where none in fact may have existed
and thus forced the courts to draw patently absurd distinctions.
The Rejection of the Aggressor Defense
Prior to 1947, the aggressor defense was accepted by nearly
every jurisdiction in the country,50 generally for the reasons outlined
above. In 1940, however, Judge Rutledge, in a now famous dictum
in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Cardilo,51 exposed the fall-
acy of the aggressor defense:
[W]ork places men under strains and fatigue from human
and mechanical impacts, creating frictions which explode in myri-
ads of ways, only some of which are immediately relevant to their
tasks. Personal animosities are created by working together on the
assembly line or in traffic. Others initiated outside the job are
magnified to the breaking point by its compelled contacts. No
worker is immune to these pressures and impacts upon temper-
ament. They accumulate and explode over incidents trivial and
important, personal and official. But the explosion point is merely
the culmination of the antecedent pressures. That it is not relevant
to the immediate task, involves a lapse from duty, or contains an
element of volition or illegality does not disconnect it from them or
nullify their causal effect in producing its injurious consequences.
52
Although the claimant in Cardillo did not strike the first blow (he
merely called his assailant a vile name, which in the opinion of the
court did not constitute aggression),53 the persuasive language of
Judge Rutledge influenced many courts in their subsequent rejection of
the aggressor defense. Commencing with the opinion in Cardillo, var-
ious courts began to re-examine their positions and adopt the view that
50. See Assaults and Horseplay, supra note 37, at 326 n.31. There were a few
exceptions. E.g., Stark v. State Industrial Accident Comm'n., 103 Ore. 80, 92, 99,
204 P. 151, 155, 157 (1922): "It is one of the principles of the workingmen's insur-
ance and compensation laws which are the products of the development of social
economic ideas that the industry which has always borne the burden of depreciation
and destruction of the necessary machinery, whether such destruction was caused within
or without the industry, shall also bear the burden of repairing the efficiency of the
human machines necessary to the life of the industry ....
The question as to who started the sport can become material only for the purpose of
fixing fault, and . . . fault of the injured employee . . . does not constitute a reason
for not allowing compensation."
51. 112 F.2d 11 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 649 (1940).
52. Id. at 17.
53. Id. at 18.
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the aggression of the claimant in itself would not bar recovery for an
injury sustained in a work-connected dispute.
The tide of judicial thinking was finally turned by the opinions
written by Justice Kenison of New Hampshire in Newell v. Moreau"' and
by Chief Justice Qua of Massachusetts in Dillon's Case, 5 wherein they
confronted the aggressor defense directly. 6 In Newell v. Moreau, the
claimant's decedent, a boss shipper, had argued with a fellow em-
ployee over the dilatory manner in which the latter had allegedly done
his work. The shipper was the first to raise his arm in a striking po-
sition but was knocked to the ground by his opponent. The result-
ing fall was fatal. The lower court denied his widow compensation
primarily on the ground that the deceased had been the aggressor.
5 7
Justice Kenison, citing Cardozo's opinion in Leonbruno v. Champlain
Silk Mills5" and that of Judge Rutledge in Cardillo,59 held that it was
error to deny compensation on the basis of the aggressor defense:
The defense of "aggressor" is not to be found in our statute or
in other laws. By the application of tort reasoning the defense has
been judicially inserted in some compensation cases. We have
already refused to read in a similar defense in sportive assaults
6 . .60 and we see no reason for its judicial insertion in this as-
sault.
Arguments, altercations and assaults are as inevitable as
they are undesirable. Where they arise out of the employment,
they may properly be regarded as an employment hazard. 61
Two years later, the Massachusetts court in Dillon's Case62 reached
a similar conclusion. Dillon, a one eyed longshoreman gang leader,
was engaged in a work related argument with one of the gang. A
blow or a few blows followed, and the leader's remaining eye was
permanently blinded. The first reviewing board denied compensation
on the ground that the claimant was the aggressor, having struck the
first blow. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the reversal
of this decision. Chief Justice Qua held that it was error to deny com-
pensation merely because the injured man was the aggressor, since fault
54. 94 N.H. 439, 55 A.2d 476 (1947).
55. 324 Mass. 102, 85 N.E.2d 69 (1949).
56. Prior to 1947, some courts allowed the aggressor to recover by finding that
his acts were privileged. E.g., Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. Ingle, 223 Ala. 127,
134 So. 878 (1931). Other courts ignored the fact of aggression. E.g., Delco-Remy
Corp. v. Cotton, 96 Ind. App. 493, 185 N.E. 341 (1933).
57. Newell v. Moreau, 94 N.H. 439, 55 A.2d 476, 478 (1947).
58. 229 N.Y. 470, 472, 128 N.E. 711 (1920).
59. 112 F.2d 11 (1940).
60. Maltais v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 93 N.H. 237, 40 A.2d 837 (1944).
61. 94 N.H. at 442-43, 55 A.2d at 479-80.
62. 324 Mass. 102, 85 N.E.2d 69 (1949).
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is not the determining factor.6 3  "[W]hen the accumulated strain
finally breaks down resistance, it seems a narrow treatment of the
problem to determine the granting or denying of compensation by the
more or less fortuitous circumstance of who aimed the first blow." 64
These two cases established a trend. The New York court, follow-
ing the reasoning of Judges Kenison and Qua, declined to be bound by
earlier narrow precedents and judicially discarded the aggressor de-
fense in 1950.65 California followed suit in 1952.66 In the quarter
of a century since the New Hampshire court first rejected the aggressor
defense, a majority of jurisdictions have come to the view that the initia-
tion of the fight by the claimant is not alone sufficient to disqualify the
aggressor from the benefits of workmen's compensation.
67
The Aggressor Defense in California
California rejected the aggressor defense in 1952 in State Com-
pensation Insurance Fund v. Industrial Accident Commission.6" Hull,
an oiler on a road construction job, was asked by his foreman to as-
sist in loading a caterpillar. The foreman did not ask Hull directly,
but passed the order through a truck driver. This angered Hull, and
an argument developed. Following this exchange of words, Hull
swung at the foreman and missed. In the ensuing fight the oiler was
injured by blows struck by the foreman. The commission denied com-
pensation, but on rehearing found that Hull's injury did arise out of and
in the course of employment, and awarded him $8.57 in temporary
disability plus medical expenses. The insurer appealed, citing dicta
in two earlier California Supreme Court cases which suggested that an
aggressor should be denied compensation.6
The California Supreme Court affirmed the award, stating that
the modem trend and the weight of reason both refuse to distinguish
between aggressors and innocent victims. The court noted that the
constitution 70 compelled affirmance of the award, in that it required
that compensation be given "irrespective of the fault of any party. ' 7
1
63. Id. at 106, 85 N.E.2d at 72.
64. Id.
65. Commissioner of Taxation & Finance v. Bronx Hosp., 276 App. Div. 708,
97 N.Y.S.2d 120 (1950).
66. State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Accident Comm'n., 38 Cal. 2d 659,
242 P.2d 311 (1952).
67. For a comprehensive listing by jurisdiction, see 1 LARSON, supra note 9,
at § 11.15(a), n.84.
68. 38 Cal. 2d 659, 242 P.2d 311 (1952).
69. Globe Indem. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n., 2 Cal. 2d 8, 37 P.2d
1039 (1934); Globe Indem. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n., 193 Cal. 470, 225
P. 273 (1924).
70. CAL. CoNST. art. XX, § 21.
71. 38 Cal. 2d at 660, 242 P.2d at 312-13.
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Furthermore, the court concluded that the crucial issue in such cases
was whether the injury "arose out of" the employment, i.e., whether
there was a causal connection between the employment and the injury.
Therefore, the charge of aggressor could not be a defense, for it was
nothing more than an assertion that the employee was at fault.12 With
the majority73 decision in State Compensation Fund, California be-
came the fourth state to disavow the aggressor defense.
Nine years later, however, the legislature intervened and amended
section 3600 of the Labor Code by adding subdivision (g).74 The ag-
gressor defense was thereby statutorily reintroduced. The new subdi-
vision provided that workmen's compensation benefits were to be
awarded so long as the "injury does not arise out of an altercation in
which the injured employee is the initial physical aggressor. ''1
5
The first case to consider this new provision was Argonaut In-
surance Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board.76 Referring
to the 1961 amendment, the court said, "Horseplay is distinguishable
from 'altercation' ",77 and allowed the injured initiator of "horseplay" to
recover. The next case to consider subdivision (g) was Litzmann v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board.78  There the court found
that the evidence did not sustain the referee's finding that the claim-
ant was the aggressor,79 but added that "even if it did, compensation
could not be denied on that ground."" ° The court also issued a strong
dictum to the effect that in view of the decision in State Compensation
Fund,8 the 1961 amendment was probably unconstitutional.8 2  This
was the state of the law when Mrs. Mathews came before the Work-
men's Compensation Appeals Board.
Mathews v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board:
The Majority Opinion
Mathews was employed by Western Contractors, Inc. as a heavy duty
truck driver at the Castaic dam site in Los Angeles county. On the
day in question, Mathews had just stopped his truck at the dam site
72. Id. at 661, 242 P.2d at 312-13.
73. The dissenting opinion argued that the aggressor had "stepped aside from his
employment, and at least as to his own injuries is not within the purview of the com-
pensation acts." Id. at 671, 242 P.2d at 319.
74. Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 2170, § 1, at 4493.
75. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3600(g) (West 1971).
76. 247 Cal. App. 2d 669, 55 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1967).
77. Id. at 682, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
78. 266 Cal. App. 2d 203, 71 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1968).
79. Id. at 209-10, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 736.
80. Id.
81. See text accompanying notes 68-72 supra.
82. 266 Cal. App. 2d at 209 n.3, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 736 n.3.
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when he was approached by Marcus Cedillo, a dump man, who was
employed to direct incoming trucks to appropriate places for unload-
ing. Cedillo told Mathews that his truck was blocking traffic and would
have to be moved. Mathews replied with an obscene remark and ges-
ture. Cedillo responded similarly. Mathews then: climbed down out
of the cab of his truck and began walking toward Cedillo with his fists
clenched at his sides. Cedillo, who was shorter and lighter than Ma-
thews, picked up two rocks and began backing away. Both men
paused, and Cedillo drew a line in the dirt with his foot, warning
Mathews not to cross it. This action apparently fueled Mathews' an-
ger. He crossed the line and advanced toward Cedillo. Cedillo threw
one of the rocks, missing Mathews. Mathews then lunged toward Ce-
dillo, losing his hard hat in the process. Cedillo struck Mathews in the
head with the second rock. Mathews fell to the ground unconscious.
He died two months later without regaining consciousness. His widow
sought workmen's compensation death benefits.83
The Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board referee awarded
her full death benefits, concluding that although Mathews' conduct fell
within the ambit of Labor Code section 3600(g), the code provision
was unconstitutional. However, on reconsideration, the board held
the provision constitutional and denied the widow benefits. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court affirmed this decision. The court concluded
that the California Constitution did not prohibit the legislature from
conditioning the right to compensation on the absence of wilful mis-
conduct or other intentional wrongdoing. Therefore, section 3600 sub-
division (g) of the Labor Code was constitutional.
8 4
The court first interpreted the statutory provision, noting that it
must be construed narrowly in keeping with the act's injunction that
workmen's compensation laws are to be liberally applied with the "pur-
pose of extending their benefits for the protection of persons injured
in the course of their employment."85  The court found that the legis-
lature's use of the word "physical" indicated that the provision was
primarily concerned with the increased risk of injury which arises when
a quarrel moves from the verbal stage to a trading of physical blows.
The majority then concluded that although Mathews did not strike the
first blow, it is not necessary that there be a battery before one can
be deemed a physical aggressor. 86 Rather, under the appropriate
circumstances, clenching a fist may be sufficient to convey a real,
present and apparent threat of physical injury. Thus, the court held
83. 6 Cal. 3d at 725, 493 P.2d at 1168, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
84. Id.
85. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3202 (West 1971).
86. Briglia v. Industrial Accident Comm'n., 27 Cal. Comp. Cases 217, 218
(1962).
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that there was sufficient evidence to support the board's finding that
Mathews was the initial physical aggressor.s
Turning to the legislative history, the court found that the use of
the phrase "irrespective of the fault of any party" in the constitution s
was intended only to give the legislature authority to establish a
workmen's compensation system and grant benefits without regard
to the common law tort concept of negligence. Thus the court equated
fault with negligence89 and found the legislature free to condition the
right to compensation on a variety of factors, including aggression.9"
In addition to this interpretation of the constitution, the court re-
lied on the traditional argument ad horrendum:91 to hold Labor Code
section 3600(g) unconstitutional would cast doubt over a vast number
of other Labor Code provisions which incorporate a notion of inten-
tional fault.9 2 Finally, the court dismissed the precedent established in
State Compensation Fund93 by stating that "[s]ince Hull [State Com-
pensation Fund], the Legislature has expressly provided that initial
physical aggressors shall not receive compensation. [W]e now follow the
expressed intent of the Legislature.""
Mathews in Critical Perspective
The decision in Mathews is open to criticism on several grounds.
The questionable constitutionality of Labor Code section 3600(g),
the difficulties inherent in the application of the aggressor defense,
the modern trend toward fuller compensation and the purpose of
workmen's compensation all suggest that the Mathews case was incor-
rectly decided.
The Constitutional Question
California Labor Code section 3600(g) resurrects the aggressor
defense which the California Supreme Court had abolished in 1952.15
Its constitutionality would seem doubtful in light of the California con-
87. 6 Cal. 3d at 727, 493 P.2d at 1169, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
88. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 21.
89. 6 Cal. 3d at 728, 734-35, 493 P.2d at 1170, 1175, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 306, 311.
90. These other factors include intoxication, self-inflicted injuries, and suicide;
see CAL. LABOR CODE § 3600(d)-(f) (West 1971).
91. For the classic example of this type of reasoning see Lord Abinger's opinion
in Priestley v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837).
92. 6 Cal. 3d at 735, 493 P.2d at 1176, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 312. E.g., CAL. LABOR
CODE § 3600(d)-(f). These sections deny compensation where the injury is caused by
intoxication, is self-inflicted, or the product of suicide.
93. See text accompanying notes 68-72 supra.
94. 6 Cal. 3d at 737, 493 P.2d at 1177, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
95. See text accompanying notes 68-72 supra.
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stitutional mandate that compensation benefits should be awarded with-
out regard to fault:
A complete system of workmen's compensation includes adequate
provisions for the comfort, health and safety and general welfare of
any and all workmen and those dependent upon them for support
to the extent of relieving from the consequences of any injury or
death incurred or sustained by workmen in the course of their em-
ployment, irrespective of the fault of any party.96
Secion 3600 of the Labor Code provides "[1liability for the compen-
sition provided by this division . . . shall, without regard to negli-
gence, exist against an employer for any injury sustained by his em-
ployees . . . and for the death of any employee if the injury proxi-
mately causes death . . . .- The majority's interpretation of La-
bor Code section 3600(g) vis-h-vis the California Constitution can
only be sustained if the terms "irrespective of the fault of any party"98'
and "without regard to negligence" 99 are entirely synonomous. That
they are not is convincingly argued in the decision of the First Circuit
in Compania Transatlantica, S.A. v. Melendez Torres. There the
court stated flatly:
[It is claimed] that the word "fault" and the word "negligence" as
used in this statute are synonymous. . . . We cannot accept this
contention.
[rihe word "fault" should not be equated with the word
"negligence." Each word has its own independent meaning. 100
After examining this decision, the findings of lexicographers, 1'0 and
certain code sections, 102 the dissent in Mathews persuasively concluded
that the terms are far from identical in their import: fault is a broad
generic term which includes the lesser word "negligence" as well as
such concepts as wilful misconduct, gross negligence, misbehavior, of-
fense, culpability, wrongdoing, and the like.
Finally, in upholding section 3600(g) as constitutional, the su-
preme court expressed fear that to do otherwise would put the valid-
ity of similar provisions in question.'0 3 However, the dissent minimized
these fears, noting that recovery in the cases of intoxication, self-in-
flicted injuries, or suicide can be barred by finding that such conduct
96. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 21 (emphasis added).
97. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3600 (West 1971).
98. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 21.
99. CAL. LABOR CODE§ 3600 (West 1971).
100. 358 F.2d 209, 213 (1st Cir. 1966) (Interpreting wrongful death statute).
101. WEsra'.s NEw ImTxNAIONAL DicriONARY, 829 (3d ed. 1961).
102. E.g., CAL. Crv. CODE § 1689(b)(2) (West Supp. 1972); CAL. Comm. CODE
§ 2613, Comment (West 1964).
103. See text accompanying notes 91 & 92 supra.
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was was not work related or reduced by invoking the wilful misconduct
statute.
0 4
It must be concluded that the test of employers' liability most com-
patible with a reasonable reading of the constitution is simply whether
the altercation arose out of and in the course of employment. If the
answer is in the affirmative, workmen's compensation benefits should
be awarded.' 0 5 Such a result is consistent with the spirit of the act
and has been advocated by writers and the courts:
It is the character and nature of the assault which determines
whether it arises out of the employment, not the culpability or lack
of culpability of the parties involved. It is the assault itself which
arises out of the employment; and who initiates the altercation
has no bearing on that question. .... 01
It would thus seem that Labor Code section 3600(g) should be deemed
unconstitutional, as the Mathews' dissent declared, " 'We cannot push
back the limits of the Constitution merely to accommodate challenged
legislation.' "107
The Application of the Aggressor Defense in Mathews
As stated earlier,"'0 the major difficulty involved in the aggres-
sor doctrine lies in the application of the defense itself, ie., in the de-
termination of who was the aggressor. The majority in Mathews re-
lied upon the tortious definition of assault in making this determina-
tion: "An 'initial physical aggressor' is one who first engages in
physical conduct which a reasonable man would perceive to be a 'real,
present and apparent threat of bodily harm' "109 The court con-
cluded that Mathews' conduct in leaving his truck and walking to-
wards Cedillo with his fists clenched at his sides was sufficient to
put a reasonable man in apprehension of bodily harm.
The court viewed the fact that Mathews struck no blow as irrele-
vant under the above theory" 0 and thus ignored the more tradi-
tional first blow test. More significantly, the court was unconcerned
with the verbal antagonism which preceded the physical confronta-
tion. Therefore, in Mathews, the determination of who was the phy-
104. 6 Cal. 3d at 744, 493 P.2d at 1182, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
105. Id. at 741, 493 P.2d at 1180, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
106. Assaults and Horseplay, supra note 37, at 347, quoted in State Comp. Ins.
Fund v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 38 Cal. 2d 659, 669, 242 P.2d 311, 317 (1952)
and in Mathews v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 6 Cal. 3d 719, 740, 493 P.2d 1165,
1179, 100 Cal. Rptr. 301, 315 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
107. 6 Cal. 3d 719, 745, 493 P.2d 1165, 1183, 100 Cal. Rptr. 301, 319 (Mosk,
J., dissenting), citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 104 (1958).
108. See text following note 49 supra.
109. 6 Cal. 3d at 727, 493 P.2d at 1169, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
110. Id.
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sical aggressor became dependent upon an arbitrary identification of
"one overt act out of a series of hostile verbal, psychological, and phy-
sical acts as the one that, for compensation purposes, caused the
quarrel and elicited the ultimate injury.""' In applying the aggres-
sor doctrine, the court was thus obliged to draw arbitrary distinc-
tions, which frequently lead to harsh, if not inequitable, consequences
for the victim and his family.
Mathews and the Modern Trend
The aggressor defense must be considered an anachronism in
view of the modem trend toward liberalizing workmen's compensation
benefits. The California Supreme Court in the State Compensation Fund
decision found that the aggressor defense is inconsistent with the so-
cial policy underlying workmen's compensation legislation. The ma-
jority of jurisdictions recognize the fact that quarrels and fights among
employees are among the normal incidents of the work environment.
Consequently, most courts now hold that when an altercation stems
from a dispute over performance of work or from frictions engendered
by the work environment, the right to compensation ought not to
turn on the issue of whether or not the injured employee was the ini-
tial aggressor.112 A further reason for this modem trend towards total
rejection of the aggressor defense is stated by Professor Small in his
book concerning workmen's compensation in Indiana: "to give .. .
effect to the so-called aggressor doctrine would be to re-incarnate the
old common law defense of assumption of risk, contributory negli-
gence and the fellow servant rule, all abolished with the passage of
the Compensation Act.""' 3 The California Supreme Court, in the Math-
ews decision, has done just that, with the result that California, once a
leader in the modem trend, has taken a significant step backward.
Mathews and the Philosophy of Workmen's Compensation
Professor Riesenfeld points out that workmen's compensation is
a type of social insurance against a particular hazard of modem life;
and, as such, it is fundamentally and intrinsically different from tort
liability.114 He states that the neglect of this distinction has been "the
cardinal sin against the injured workman. [N]one of the traditional
restrictive tort doctrines such as 'scope of employment,' 'proximate
causation,' 'assumption of risk' and 'blameworthiness' should ever be
111. 1 AISN, supra note 9, at § 11.15(c).
112. See note 67 supra.
113. B. SMALL, WoRKMEN's COMPENSATION LAW OF INDIANA § 6.8 (1950).
114. Riesenfeld, Forty Years of American Workmen's Compensation, 35 MINN.
L. RFv. 525, 529 (1951).
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relied upon in compensation cases." 115  This philosophy had been
adopted in California. Its workmen's compensation system, in theory at
least, substitutes the proposition of liability without fault for the com-
mon law concept of liability based upon culpability:
The ultimate "social philosophy" . . . behind nonfault compensa-
tion liability is the desirability of providing, in the most efficient,
most dignified, and most certain form, the financial and medical
benefits which an enlightened community would feel obliged to
provide in any case in some less satisfactory form, and of allocating
the burden of these payments to the most appropriate source.
This statement, of course, is what might be called compen-
sation theory in pure or idealized form. In the actual statutes,
and still more in case-law interpretations, a greater or less admix-
ture of the "fault" idea will be found in every jurisdiction. How-
ever, the whole story of the development of workmen's compensa-
tion is a record of movement in the direction of the "pure theory"
stated above, and away from the fault concept. 116
The Mathews decision is thus a departure from both the development
and the ultimate social philosophy of workmen's compensation.
Conclusion
This note has put the case of Mathews v. Workmen's Compen-
sation Appeals Board in social and historical perspective. It has
traced the judicial history of the aggressor defense, its rejection by a
majority of jurisdictions, and the resurrection of the aggressor doctrine
by the California legislature and the California Supreme Court. It
has been argued that the aggressor defense is an anachronism, and it
is hoped that the California legislature, together with the judiciary, will
come to the realization that this doctrine has no place in a socially
responsible system of workmen's compensation.
Gall Boreman Bird*
115. Id. at 531.
116. 1 LARSON, supra note 9, at § 2.20.
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